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It is 8:00 a.m. in a Chicago public housing project. As some resi-
dents get ready to start their day, an uneasy feeling envelops them. A
mother awakens her son, who slept in the bathtub for fear that bullets
would crash through his window. In another apartment, an elderly
woman counts her money to make sure she has enough to pay the
"toll" that gang members charge to ride the elevator. Children who
walk to school must maneuver around needles and crack vials while
simultaneously avoiding random gunfire.
Maintenance workers in another building attempt to sneak into an
apartment to install window guards. Last time they had to "pull out"
after gang members told the superintendent to "get his white ass out
of there." As he left, his car was sprayed with automatic gunfire.
Other maintenance workers carry knives, wrenches, and golf clubs to
protect themselves. In addition, residents often do not receive mail
because the United States Postal Service refuses to deliver, out of fear
for mail carriers' safety.
Such is the way of life, not only in Chicago, but in many public
housing developments throughout the United States.1 Crime and
vandalism, long endemic in public housing, have been exacerbated
significantly by increased drug abuse.' Drug gangs control the
developments by "imposing a reign of terror" on public housing
tenants.' Law enforcement officers are often reluctant to enter
* I am grateful to Professors Robert Cooper and Abner Greene of Fordham
University School of Law for their encouragement and editorial support during the
writing of this Note.
1. This account was taken from various articles describing life in Chicago public
housing and other projects around the country. See Bettina Boxall, Housing Project Is
a Study in Contrasts, L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1989, § 2, at 1; Vincent Lane, Public Hous-
ing Sweep Stakes, Pol'y Rev., Summer 1994, at 68, 69; John Leo, Sweeping Up the
Projects, U.S. News & World Rep., May 2, 1994, at 20; Rob Teir, Tenants' Privacy
Held Captive By Crime, Nat'l L. J., May 9, 1994, at A21, A22; Camilo Josd Vergara,
Hell in a Very Tall Place, The Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1989, at 72, 78.
2. See infra note 37.
3. As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress passed the Public
Housing Drug Elimination Program. Congress found that "drug dealers are increas-
ingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income
housing tenants." Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-690,




some developments because they too have become victims of vio-
lence.4
Today there are approximately 1.4 million units of public housing in
the United States.5 Although most public housing developments pro-
vide decent homes for residents,6 an increasing number of projects
have experienced such an increase in criminal activity that they are
described as "war zones"'7 and "hell." 8 In Los Angeles, the housing
police bitterly joke, "We own it; [the drug dealers] run it." 9
On September 20, 1988, in response to increasing violent crime in
one of Chicago's public housing developments, Vincent Lane, the Ex-
ecutive Director of the Chicago Housing Authority, instituted "Oper-
ation Clean Sweep."'10 In that operation, CHA officials and Chicago
4. For example, see Vicki Hyman, Bullets Barely Miss Patrolling Deputy, Times-
Picayune, Sept. 2, 1994, at B2 (describing a sniper attack on a police officer in a New
Orleans public housing project).
5. According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's most re-
cent figures, 1,360,000 units of public housing exist in the United States. 1992 HUD
Ann. Rep. 62.
6. In 1989, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Dis-
tressed Housing and charged it with devising a National Action Plan to eradicate
severely distressed public housing by the year 2000. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, §§ 501-07, 103 Stat. 1987,
2048-52 (1989). The Commission defines "severely distressed public housing" as
housing where at least one of the following factors is present: (1) families living in
distress; (2) high rates of serious crimes in the development or surrounding neighbor-
hood; (3) barriers to managing the environment; and (4) physical deterioration of
buildings. The Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing B-2 to B-9 (1992) [hereinafter The Final Report]. The Commission's report,
released in 1992, found that only six percent, or approximately 86,000 units, are se-
verely distressed, but warns that if action is not taken, the number will increase. Id. at
2.
7. Thomas Moore et al., Dead Zones, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 10, 1989, at
20, 24.
8. Vergara, supra note 1, at 72.
9. Terence Dunworth & Aaron Saiger, Nat'l Inst. of Just., Drugs and Crime in
Public Housing: A Three-City Analysis iii (Mar. 1994).
10. Operation Clean Sweep is officially entitled the Emergency Housing Inspec-
tion Program. It is a comprehensive, multistage program consisting of three phases.
Phase I, the most widely publicized, entails securing the building and restoring com-
mon areas. This phase has 12 steps: (1) selecting the site to be swept; (2) gathering
sweep participants at a central staging area; (3) securing perimeter of building by
placing police at all entrances and exits; (4) notifying the CHA that perimeter is se-
cured; (5) notifying the press that a sweep is under way; (6) opening an operation
center to provide residents with information and to process work orders; (7) inspect-
ing each unit; (8) replacing police with CHA security officers after inspections; (9)
enclosing the lobby to control access; (10) instituting a guest policy and issuing identi-
fication cards to residents; (11) making the necessary building repairs identified dur-
ing the inspections; and (12) assessing the residents' needs for services. Phase II
entails improving property management. This includes administration management,
designed to remove unlawful tenants and ensure compliance with housing policies by
future residents, and maintenance management, designed to repair vacant units and
reoccupy them as soon as possible. Phase III entails providing resident services. This
involves identifying and offering aid to residents with problems such as unemploy-
ment, substance abuse, day care, and domestic violence. Drugs in Federally Assisted
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police officers staged a military-like assault on one of the CHA's rav-
aged buildings. Upon arrival, police sealed off all building entrances
and exits and secured the stairways, hallways, and other common ar-
eas. Then, both police and CHA officials conducted door-to-door
searches for weapons, drugs, unauthorized residents, and unsafe or
unsanitary conditions."
HUD Secretary Jack Kemp praised Operation Clean Sweep as a
"progressive" and "innovative" response to the crime problem in pub-
lic housing.12 While the sweeps did not eliminate the CHA's crime
problem, there is evidence that the crime rate decreased following the
sweeps.'3 As a result of its initial success, the operation has become a
model for other cities facing similar problems in large public housing
developments.' 4
Despite their popularity among beleaguered residents and housing
officials, the sweeps raised constitutional questions concerning the
Fourth Amendment, because they were conducted without warrants
or probable cause.'5 The American Civil Liberties Union filed a com-
plaint against the CHA on December 16, 1988, claiming that the
sweeps were unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 6
Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, July 20, 1989, at 103, 117-26 (testi-
mony of Vincent Lane, Chairman, Chicago Housing Authority); Barbara Webster &
Edward F. Connors, Nat'l Inst. of Just., The Police, Drugs, and Public Housing 2-3
(June 1992).
11. See supra note 10.
12. Jack Kemp, Drug-Free Housing for the Nation's Poor, Wash. Post, Apr. 17,
1989, at A19.
13. Between 1988 and 1991, the violent crime level in Chicago increased 31%,
while in public housing the increase was 21%. Patrick T. Reardon, Without Sweeps,
CHA Crime Might Be Worse, ChLi. Trib., Oct. 26, 1992, at 1.
14. Robert Lee, Proposal to 'Seal Off' Projects is Part of a National Trend, Balti-
more Sun, Jan. 16, 1991, at 6 (describing "sweep" or "secure" programs by public
housing authorities in Philadelphia, Chicago, Newark, and Boston).
15. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause are "per se unreasonable ...
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Probable cause can be defined as whether a
reasonable person can conclude from the facts and circumstances that a crime oc-
curred or that evidence of a crime is located in a place to be searched. 1 John Wesley
Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 3.8, at 82 (2d ed. 1991). The sweeps were problematic
because they were conducted in response to random acts of crime, such as sniper fire,
in which no person or persons were identified as suspects. Pratt v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
16. Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-10566 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 16,
1988). The first and second allegations in the complaint were based upon a claim of
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The CHA contended that the sweeps were conducted in response to
emergency circumstances and were therefore constitutional. 7 In an
effort to avoid lengthy litigation, the parties entered into a court-ap-
proved consent decree limiting the substance and breadth of the
searches.'
The sweeps continued without incident for four years. On October
13, 1992, however, a seven-year old boy on his way to school was shot
to death in a Chicago housing project by a sniper.19 The crime out-
raged the community and the city of Chicago. Over the next several
months, CHA officials and Chicago police officers conducted sweeps
with renewed vigilance, ignoring many of the limits of the consent de-
cree. Rather than conducting general housing inspections, as defined
by the consent decree, the new round of sweeps were substantially
more invasive than were the previous sweeps.2 In response, the
ACLU, on behalf of four tenants who opposed the sweeps, filed a
class action suit against the CHA, resulting in the decision in Pratt v.
Chicago Housing Authority.2 '
The Pratt Decision
In Pratt, United States District Judge Wayne Andersen issued a pre-
liminary injunction against further sweeps.22 He ruled that sweeps
that were not conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the con-
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Steven
Yarosh, Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing Authority 'Sweep-
ing' Away the Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1103, 1105 n.14 (1992) (discuss-
ing the Summeries complaint).
17. The CHA claimed that the searches occurred in response to "exigent" circum-
stances. Exigency is one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions" to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
Exigency refers to emergency circumstances posing an immediate threat to the lives
of others. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so
would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others."); Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (outlining standards for determining whether
exigent circumstances justified entry into a home). When exigent circumstances exist,
a warrant is not required to conduct a search. Hall, supra note 15, § 14:1, at 582.
18. Under the terms of the decree, the CHA can no longer search the person or
personal effects of any individual. In addition, contents of property such as closets,
drawers, medicine cabinets, boxes, or other containers are not to be searched. Finally,
police officers may no longer act as an investigating party. Rather, police officers may
only accompany CHA staff members who conduct the inspections. Yarosh, supra note
16, at 1105 (discussing terms of the consent decree).
19. Matthew Nickerson, Sniper Kills Cabrini Kid Steps From School, Chi. Trib.,
Oct. 14, 1992, at 1.
20. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 794 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (outlin-
ing the distinctions between searches conducted in accordance with consent decree
guidelines, and the new round of sweeps).
21. 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. IlM. 1994).
22. The Court issued a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood that the
sweeps would be ruled unconstitutional. Id. at 794.
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sent decree violated the Fourth Amendment.' Judge Andersen rea-
soned that because the sweeps were ordered without probable cause,
they were per se unreasonable.' Furthermore, he found that exigent
circumstances did not exist at the time the searches were conducted.'
Although the CHA was enjoined from conducting warrantless
searches of tenants' apartments, the injunction did not prevent the
CHA from conducting searches pursuant to valid search warrants or
conducting warrantless searches in common areas and vacant apart-
ments2 6 In addition, searches were allowed when a clear emergency
existed and there was probable cause to believe a crime was commit-
ted. 7 Finally, searches were allowed if conducted pursuant to the oral
or written consent of the residents or if they were consistent with the
previous consent decree. 8
Although the ACLU hailed the Pratt decision as a victory for civil
rights, members of the CHA community were angry because they be-
lieved the sweeps were effective. A week after the Pratt decision,
Judge Andersen was forced to decertify the class after receiving a peti-
tion with over 5,000 signatures from tenants who supported the
sweeps. 9 Eighteen of the nineteen tenant councils in the CHA sup-
ported the sweeps.30 Even those residents with reservations about the
invasion of privacy stated that the searches were necessary "because a
lot of innocent people [were] getting shot."''3 In addition, President
Clinton criticized the decision, contrasting Fourth Amendment rights
to be free from warrantless searches with "the right to go out to the
playground; ... to sit by an open window [or] go to school safely in
the morning. '32 Immediately following Judge Andersen's ruling, the
President instructed the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment and the Department of Justice to devise a constitutionally per-
missive strategy to protect residents in the nation's public housing
23. Id at 797.
24. Id. at 795.
25. Judge Andersen found no exigent circumstances because the sweeps never




29. Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, 155 F.RD. 177 (N.D. Ill 1994). At one
point in the Pratt decision, Judge Andersen noted how "many Americans ... would
not dream of allowing police to search their own homes [but] they support police
sweeps of inner city neighborhoods." Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 796. Apparently, Judge
Andersen failed to realize that it was the public housing residents who supported the
sweeps.
30. Leo, supra note 1, at 20. Presidents from 18 of the 19 Local Advisory Councils
intervened in the Pratt case and contended that the sweeps did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793.
31. Robert Davis & Kevin Johnson, In Projects, It's 'Pop' vs. Privacy, USA Today,
April 18, 1994, at 3A.
32. President's Radio Address, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 823 (April 16, 1994).
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communities. 33 On April 16, 1994, pursuant to the President's instruc-
tions, the Administration announced a policy aimed at curbing crime
in public housing.3
The Government's Five-Point Plan
In a press conference outlining the government's five-point
plan, HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros spoke about the "eruption
of violence" in Chicago's public housing projects.35 In addition,
he emphasized that the violence was not limited to Chicago. 6
As a result of widespread violence in public housing projects
throughout the country,37 the government's plan was formulated
33. Id.
34. Press Briefing by Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cis-
neros and Acting Associate Attorney General Bill Bryson, 1994 WL 130857 (White
House) (Apr. 16, 1994)[hereinafter Press Briefing].
35. 1& at *1. In Chicago, in 1991, the citywide rate of violent crime was 32.5/1000,
while in public housing it was 54/1000. Reardon, supra note 13.
36. Press Briefing, supra note 34, at *1.
37. While there is a lack of national data outlining the extent of drug and crime
problems in public housing, Dunworth & Saiger, supra note 9, at 2, 70; The Final
Report, supra note 6, at B-1 to B-2, available statistics confirm anecdotal reports that
violence in public housing projects far exceeds that of the community at large. A
study on crime in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Phoenix public housing
projects, revealed that between 1986 and 1989, the rates of violent offenses, per 1000
residents, greatly exceeded the rate of offenses citywide. Dunworth & Saiger, supra
note 9. The rate of violent offenses in Los Angeles was 22/1000 compared with 67/
1000 in the city's public housing developments. Id. at 37 fig. 4.2. In Phoenix, the rate
was 9/1000 compared with 54/1000 in Phoenix public housing developments. Id. Fi-
nally, in Washington, D.C., the rate of violent offenses was 19/1000 compared with 41/
1000 in public housing developments. Id
This same study showed that the drug crime problem in these cities paralleled the
violent crime problem. In Los Angeles, the number of arrests citywide for drug of-
fenses was 16/1000, while in public housing it was 58/1000. Id at 34 fig. 4.1. In Phoe-
nix, the citywide rate was 5/1000, while in public housing it was 53/1000. Id. Finally, in
Washington, D.C., the citywide rate was 24/1000, while in public housing it was 32/
1000. Id. Although the authors of the study cautioned that this data alone made it
impossible to determine if drugs and violence are causally related, they concluded
that "[c]learly... both types of offenses occur at much greater rates in housing devel-
opments than elsewhere." Id. at 36.
Statistics from other cities similarly demonstrate that crime in public housing
projects exceeds that in the community at large. In New Orleans, between 1989 and
1993, approximately 45% of the city's drug-related murders occurred in public hous-
ing developments. Jim Yardley, Terror Stalks the Poor in New Orleans, Atlanta J. &
Const., Sept. 1, 1994, at A3. In New York, in 1994, the felony crime rate fell three
times faster citywide than in public housing projects. Clifford Krauss, Giuliani Says
Police Merger Won't Hurt Housing Safety, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 20, 1994, at B3.
While these statistics are not comprehensive, they illustrate the conditions that af-
fect many public housing tenants around the nation. Deplorable conditions and ex-
cessive crime have destroyed residents' quality of life. Housing officials' attempts to
improve conditions often have been rendered useless by the control that drug dealers
exert over public housing developments. In Bridgeport, Connecticut, for example,
crime in one public housing project was so bad that all residents were moved out and
the entire complex was closed. Bridgeport Housing Project to Close, A Victim of
Crime, N.Y. Tunes, July 9, 1994, at 21.
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so that it could be implemented by housing authorities nation-
wide. 8
The plan essentially consists of five elements: (1) placing metal de-
tectors at building entrances; (2) erecting fences around public hous-
ing projects; (3) conducting sweeps in "common areas" such as
stairwells, vacant apartments, and hallways; (4) frisking suspicious
looking individuals; and (5) urging tenants to sign consent forms that
permit police searches for weapons without a warrant or probable
cause.
39
The fifth element of the plan is the most controversial because the
Administration proposes to insert the consent forms as a clause in
public housing leases.4 Critics attacked the idea of requiring tenants
to sign leases containing "consent clauses," because they contend that
such clauses place low-income tenants "over a barrel" by suggesting
that tenants must compromise their constitutional rights to obtain
public housing benefits.41 The objection is twofold: First, tenants are
being "coerced" into signing the consent forms out of fear of losing
their homes and therefore the consent is not voluntary and is thus
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.42 Second, even if the consent
were valid, the government cannot force tenants to surrender consti-
tutional rights to receive governmental benefits.43
When the government intrudes upon an individual's privacy, the de-
bate is often emotional and heated. While residents welcome the use
of consent clauses as a weapon against endless crime, civil libertarians
accuse the government of treating public housing residents as second-
class citizens.
Though the use of sweeps has been litigated, the constitutionality of
consent clauses is still unresolved. In addition, the debate continues
as to whether the government can make acceptance of the consent
clause a prerequisite to receiving public housing benefits.
This Note contends that the government may constitutionally re-
quire consent to search as a prerequisite to obtaining residence in
public housing projects. Part I examines the consent exception to the
Fourth Amendment and then considers whether the consent required
38. Press Briefing, supra note 34, at *1.
39. kI at *2-3.
40. For example, the Paterson Housing Authority amended their leases to include
"consent clauses" allowing the sweeps so that administrators may enter apartments
"without advance notice" in the event of a building-wide inspection. Jerry DeMarco,
The Newest Way to Fight Crime, Bergen Rec., Dec. 7, 1994, at B2.
41. See Gwen Ifill, Kemp Quarterbacks a Drug Fight, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1989, at
A17; Mitchell Locin & Jan Crawford, Tenant Consent Likely For Sweeps, Chi. Trib.
Apr. 15, 1994, at 1, 8; Tracey Maclin, Warrantless Sweeps Are an Erosion of Freedom,
Hous. Chron., Apr. 22, 1994, at 33; Safety-For-Rights a Bad Trade, Chi. Trib., Apr. 19,
1994, at 22.
42. See discussion infra part I.B.
43. See discussion infra part II.
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by the nation's public housing authorities is voluntary in nature or the
product of duress. Part II addresses the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, which posits that the government may not condition receipt
of a public benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right. This prt
provides a brief history of the doctrine as well as a description of the
leading views on the doctrine today. It argues that the doctrine is
overly formalistic and concludes that the best way to analyze unconsti-
tutional conditions problems is to weigh the constitutional right at is-
sue against the justifications that the government offers for intruding
upon that right. Accordingly, part III examines the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of public housing tenants and the underlying justifications
for using consent clauses. This Note concludes that the Constitution
does not forbid the government from requiring public housing tenants
to consent to searches and that the searches are a necessary tool in
combating crime in public housing projects.
I. PUBLIC HousING LEASES AND THE CONSENT EXCEPTION TO
THE FoURTH AMENDMENT
Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures are presump-
tively unconstitutional if conducted without a warrant issued upon
probable cause, "subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."" Consent is an exception to both the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Only consent that is freely and voluntarily given, however, is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 6
Prior to 1973, courts applied two distinct theories to analyze the con-
sent exception and determine whether consent was voluntary: waiver
of a known right and voluntariness.47 Under the waiver theory, con-
sent only can be valid if the person is informed of his or her Fourth
Amendment rights and of the constitutional right to withhold con-
sent.' Under the voluntariness theory, determining the consent's va-
lidity involves examining all of the circumstances surrounding the
consent to ensure the absence of coercion.49 The distinction is impor-
tant because under the latter theory, people can voluntarily consent to
a search without being informed that they have a constitutional right
to refuse.0
In 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,51 the Supreme Court re-
solved the question of what constitutes valid consent by endorsing the
44. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
45. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
46. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
47. Hall, supra note 15, § 8:5, at 386.
48. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221-22.
49. I at 221.
50. Hall, supra note 15, § 8:5, at 386.
51. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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voluntariness theory. In Schneckloth, a California police officer
stopped an automobile after observing that one headlight and the li-
cense plate light were burned out.52 Bustamonte was one of six men
in the car, only one of whom was able to produce identification. 53 Af-
ter one passenger claimed that the car belonged to his brother, the
officer asked if he could search the vehicle.5' The passenger gave con-
sent to the officer and assisted in the search.55 Eventually, the officer
discovered three stolen checks under the rear seat.56 After the trial
court denied a motion to suppress, the checks were admitted into evi-
dence, leading to Bustamonte's conviction for possessing a check with
intent to defraud.57
The California Court of Appeal affirmed Bustamonte's conviction,
applying the voluntariness theory.58 The Ninth Circuit, on habeas
corpus review, remanded the case,5 9 applying the waiver theory of
consent and holding that the state failed to demonstrate that the of-
ficer had informed Bustamonte of his right to withhold consent6 On
appeal, the Supreme Court faced the issue of what the prosecution
must prove61 to demonstrate that consent is voluntary and therefore
valid: (1) the person understood that his consent could be freely and
effectively withheld or (2) that voluntariness can be shown by the cir-
cumstances surrounding the consent.62 The Court agreed with the
California courts, which had adopted the voluntariness theory of con-
sent, and concluded:
[T]he question of whether a consent to a search was in fact "volun-
tary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is
a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the cir-
cumstances. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish
such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.'






58. California v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied further review. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221 n2.
59. Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing the
denial of Bustamonte's original application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal dis-
trict court). The report of the district court is unreported. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
221 n.2.
60. 448 F.2d at 701.
61. When the government seeks to sustain a search as consensual, the government
has the burden of proof. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) ("When
a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has
the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.").
62. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223.
63. Id at 227.
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Thus, a court must examine the facts and circumstances of each case
to determine if consent was coerced or voluntarily given. Under
Schneckloth, a housing tenant need not be informed of the right to
refuse to consent to searches, provided that the tenant consents volun-
tarily. To determine if a tenant's consent obtained through a consent
clause is voluntary, the Schneckloth test requires a court to examine
the circumstances surrounding the tenant's signing of a lease contain-
ing the consent clause. Because a public housing lease is a contract
between the public housing authority and the tenant,64 contract law
provides the proper framework in which to examine (1) whether a
person can waive constitutional rights through contract and (2)
whether the abdication of Fourth Amendment rights in a public hous-
ing lease is voluntary.
A. Contracts and Constitutional Rights
An initial question involves whether a person can contract to forfeit
constitutional rights. There are two distinct views. The first treats
constitutional rights as analogous to labor or other services and favors
free exchange in the marketplace.65 This position is based on the as-
sumption that individuals are free to judge the worth of their constitu-
tional rights,66 and because they can invoke or waive these rights at
will, they should also be able to sell them.67 The second view posits
that constitutional rights are inalienable and thus cannot be trans-
ferred or sold.68 This position is generally derived from paternalistic
theories that force citizens to retain their constitutional rights for their
own good, regardless of the value individuals may assign to them.69
Depending upon the right in question, the Supreme Court has es-
poused both views. While some constitutional rights are unquestiona-
64. Because a lease transfers a possessory interest in land, it is commonly thought
of as a conveyance. While this is true in some respects, there has been a shift by
courts in the last several decades. Courts now emphasize the contractual nature of
the lease and shape the law of leases using contract principles. See Roger A. Cunning-
ham et al., The Law of Property § 6.10, at 258-60 (2d ed. 1993); Jesse Dukeminier &
James E. Krier, Property 438-39 (3d ed. 1993).
65. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 346-47 (1982) ("If people




68. An example of this view is an argument by Justice Douglas that the govern-
ment should not be allowed "to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Wy-
man v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Insurance
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("A man may not barter away his life
or his freedom, or his substantial rights.").
69. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413,
1480-81 (1989) (describing theories of paternalism).
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bly inalienable,70 the Court has affirmed that a person may contract
away others. For example, in Snepp v. United States,7" the Supreme
Court rejected a First Amendment argument and held that a former
CIA agent breached his employment contract with the government by
failing to submit a manuscript of a book for Agency approval. 72 As an
express condition of his employment with the CIA, Snepp had
"pledged not to divulge classified information and not to publish any
information without prepublication clearance."'  Snepp claimed that
the contract was unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected
speech because the agreement included non-classified information.7'
The Court rejected this argument and observed that "[w]hen Snepp
accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agree-
ment that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication
for prior review. He does not claim that he executed this agreement
under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency."'7
Snepp thus supports the proposition that when one voluntarily en-
ters into a contract, the terms may include surrender of a constitu-
tional right. Snepp is distinguishable from cases involving consent
clauses, however, because Snepp did not involve criminal prosecution.
In Snepp, the only risk associated with surrendering a First Amend-
ment right was the inability to publish a book without prior approval.
Public housing tenants who surrender a Fourth Amendment right,
however, face a much greater risk-criminal prosecution.76 Even if
70. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243-44 (1911) (prohibiting employees
from contracting away Thirteenth Amendment rights through an employment agree-
ment). Rights generally thought to be inalienable are those that are relational; rights
that keep the moral fabric of society together. Individuals should not be able to relin-
quish these types of rights. They include the right not to be a slave, the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to life. Diana T. Meyers, Ina-
lienable Rights: A Defense 53 (1985) (urging that certain rights cannot be -re-
nounced conscientiously").
71. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 510.
73. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 509 n.3.
75. Id
76. In a case involving home searches and the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court found no constitutional violation. In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the
Court addressed the issue of whether the government could condition the receipt of
welfare benefits on the recipient's submission to warrantless searches of her home. Id.
at 310. In Wyman, New York statutes prescribed as a condition of receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, periodic home visits by caseworkers. Id. at 312.
The Court noted that the only penalty for refusing to allow a visit was that "aid...
merely ceases." Id. at 318. The Court noted two main purposes for the visits: assist-
ing in the rehabilitation of the parent recipient and ensuring that the needs of the
dependent child were being met. Id. at 317-19. Based on these important purposes,
the Court concluded that the home visit was not unreasonable and therefore did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 317.
Importantly, the Court distinguished cases in which the result of the search was
criminal prosecution. Id at 325. In Wyman, the Court emphasized that the recipient
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the result of such intrusion would be prosecution, however, a person
may contract away his right to be free from some warrantless govern-
mental intrusions. The Court recognized this freedom in Zap v.
United States.77
Zap was a contractor doing work for the Navy. His contract with
the Navy included a provision that authorized the government to au-
dit his records. 78 After the government conducted an inspection of
Zap's records, they confiscated a check as evidence of a fraudulent
claim that violated federal law. 79 After his conviction, Zap moved to
have the check stricken as evidence, on the ground that it was illegally
obtained.80 The Court stated that the "law of searches and seizures
... is the product of the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. But those rights may be waived." 81 When Zap, "in order to
obtain the Government's business, specifically agreed to permit in-
spection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim
to privacy which he otherwise might have had." 8 As Snepp and Zap
indicate, an individual may voluntarily enter into an agreement, the
terms of which may include surrender of a constitutional right, regard-




Although it is possible to contract away certain constitutional rights,
the agreement must be voluntary. Courts routinely hold that an
agreement is voluntary unless it is the product of duress.84 The first
"is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home visit and is not about to be
so prosecuted." Id.
Although Wyman is persuasive because of the similarity between welfare benefits
and public housing benefits, it is distinguishable from cases involving consent clauses
because there was no risk of criminal prosecution in Wyman.
77. 328 U.S. 624 (1946), vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947). Although
the indictment in Zap v. United States was dismissed, the case is still cited as authority
in Fourth Amendment consent cases. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1062 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Picariello,
568 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Teeven, 745 F. Supp. 220, 234-35
(D. Del. 1990); Fowler v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation, 704 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
78. Id. at 626-27.
79. Id. at 627-28.
80. Id. at 628.
81. Il
82. Id.
83. In the criminal context, defendants often waive constitutional rights. See North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979) (waiving rights against self-incrimina-
tion); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (observing that "the [govern-
ment] may encourage pleas by offering... benefits in return for the plea").
84. See Shaheen v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 873 F.2d 105, 107 (6th Cir. 1989); Mellon
Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980); Bank
IV Salina, N.A. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, Co., 810 F. Supp. 1196, 1204 (D. Kan.
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part of this section discusses whether public housing residents are be-
mg subjected to duress when they are presented with a lease contain-
ing a consent clause. The second part examines whether a lease
containing a consent clause is unconscionable and therefore invalid.
1. Duress
One of the central arguments against the use of consent clauses in
public housing leases is that the resulting agreement is the product of
duress. Duress can be defined in various ways.s5 First, it implies a
threat of violence that forces a person to sign a contract.86 Under
such circumstances, the resulting contract would not be valid because
it was not entered into willingly. Duress also may be present when a
party threatens nonperformance in an effort to modify the terms of
the existing contract.87 In yet another form, duress is a synonym for
fraud, as where an illiterate person is induced to sign a contract that
has unfavorable terms that are not explained to him.18 In addition,
critics argue that tenants are under duress when they have no choice
but to sign the lease containing the consent clause because they can-
not move elsewhere.'
Despite the abundance of low-income housing programs,90 some
low-income households still encounter difficulty in obtaining afforda-
1992); Mid-State Electric, Inc. v. H.L. Libby Co., 787 F. Supp. 494, 497 (W.D. Pa.
1992). Normally, contracts that are the product of duress are either voidable at the
election of the coerced party or altogether void if the situation involves the absence of
consent rather than coerced consent. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law
of Contracts § 9-8, at 349 (3d ed. 1987).
85. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 84, at 336-39; Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law § 4.7, at 113-17 (4th ed. 1992).
86. Posner, supra note 85, at 113.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 113-14.
89. See Locin & Crawford, supra note 41, at 8.
90. Since 1973, the government has enacted legislation to increase the variety of
programs that deliver housing assistance. Two programs initiated by the government
in 1974 are the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation Program.
in which the government subsidizes the rents of tenants who live in new or substan-
tially renovated structures owned by private developers, Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8(b)(2), 88 Stat. 633, 663 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988)), and the Section 8 Existing Certificate Program, in which
the government issues participating residents certificates, enabling them to rent
homes from any private landlord whose housing meets federal requirements. Id.
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437j (1988)).
Other initiatives include the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program, I.R.C. § 42
(1992), programs that subsidize the interest rate that developers pay on loans used to
acquire or build low income housing, Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L No. 87-70,
§ 101(a), 75 Stat. 149 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715! (1988)), and programs that dis-
tribute funds to local governments to subsidize construction and renovation by private
developers. HOME Investment Partnerships Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, §§ 201-226,
104 Stat. 4094, 4094-114 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12721-12756 (Supp. V 1993)). Fi-
nally, recently-enacted legislation aims to facilitate the sale of public housing units to
tenants. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L No. 101-625,
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ble housing other than in public housing projects. Popular programs
such as Section 8,9' which has assumed much of the responsibility of
housing low-income households, are not available to many residents.'
In addition, a majority of public housing residents are non-white and
often face discrimination in the housing market. 93 Many public hous-
ing households are single-headed or are occupied by elderly people
who may have difficulty relocating.94 Finally, because the median in-
come of public housing households is $6571, 91 subsidies and vouchers
may not provide adequate assistance for those residents who want to
move out of public housing.
Despite claims that public housing tenants cannot move elsewhere,
they do have choices. Public housing should be distinguished from
other forms of federally supported housing assistance because it is
only one of several programs sponsored by the federal government to
assist low-income households. 96 Present low-income housing assist-
ance employs a mixed system of public and private ownership. The
federal government has subsidized the construction of approximately
1.4 million public housing units owned and operated by the public sec-
tor.97 An even larger number of households are assisted by federal
rent subsidies and vouchers that supplement the rent paid by tenants
for housing owned by private developers.9"
§ 411, 104 Stat. 4079, 4148 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437aaa-
1437aaa8 (Supp. V 1993)). See also Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low In-
come Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 878, 899
(1990) (describing alternative housing programs).
91. See supra note 90.
92. Because the Section 8 program involves private developers, the program is
only successful to the extent that private developers participate in it. In addition,
reductions in HUD funding translate into fewer certificates and vouchers available for
low-income households. Finally, households attempting to enter Section 8 housing
face long waiting lists. For a discussion of problems concerning Section 8, see
Deborah Kenn, Fighting the Housing Crisis With Underachieving Programs: The
Problem With Section 8, 44 J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 77, 77-82 (1993).
93. Connie H. Casey, Office of Pol'y Dev. & Res., Characteristics of HUD-Assisted
Renters and Their Units in 1989 5 (1992); see House Judiciary Comm., Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176; James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 Vand. L. Rev.
1049, 1052-60 (1989) (discussing housing discrimination against minorities).
94. Approximately 47% of households in public housing are headed by one per-
son, Casey, supra note 93, at 7, and 38% of public housing residents are elderly. Id. at
5.
95. Id at 10.
96. See supra note 90.
97. See supra note 5.
98. According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's most re-
cent figures, 4,070,000 households receive assistance from HUD. Of that number,
1,360,000 households are in public housing, 1,060,000 households participate in the
Section 8 certificate or voucher program, and 1,650,000 households are living in pri-
vate units subsidized by HUD programs. Thus, roughly 33% of households receiving
HUD assistance live in public housing while 66% receive other federal assistance.
1992 HUD Ann. Rep. 62.
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While it is true that some public housing residents cannot move
elsewhere, this does not necessarily indicate that they are under du-
ress. A defense of duress is only available to public housing tenants
who can show that they would not have entered into the agreement
absent some coercive behavior by the public housing authority. 9
Placing a consent clause in a public housing lease is not a coercive act
that limits a tenant's choice. Accordingly, the argument that tenants
are being subjected to duress because they lack choices is
unpersuasive.
Because a contract between a large entity and an ordinary individ-
ual can be coercive-especially when the individual is poor I°- crit-
ics also argue that the inequality of bargaining power between the
public housing authority and tenants indicates that tenants are being
subjected to duress. 1 1 This is characterized as "economic duress" and
renders a contract voidable where "undue or unjust advantage has
been taken of a person's economic necessity or distress to coerce him
into making the agreement. ' '102 To prove economic duress, however,
the claim must be based on affirmative acts of a contracting party and
"not merely on the necessities of the purported victim., 10 3
Placing the consent clause within a lease is not an affirmative act
constituting duress because it does not affect the bargaining position
of the tenants. 1° 4 The impoverished circumstances and subsequent in-
equality of bargaining power of public housing tenants are not suffi-
cient to render an agreement voidable.
99. See Gustin v. FDIC, 835 F. Supp. 503, 508 (W.D. Mo. 1993); Evans v. Waldorf-
Astoria, Co., 827 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1994);
FDIC v. Meyer, 755 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1991); Robert E. Scott & Douglas L
Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 433 (2d ed. 1993).
100. The assumption is often based on the use of standardized forms and a gross
disparity in bargaining power. Posner, supra note 85, at 114.
101. See Macin, supra note 41, at 33.
102. Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1978); see Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 977 F.2d 309, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1992); Sheehan v. Atlanta Int'l
Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1987); Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. United
Say. Ass'n of Texas, 789 F. Supp. 848, 853-54 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Cochran v. Ernst &
Young, 758 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-57 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
103. Chouinard, 568 F.2d at 434. See also Business Incentives Co. v. Sony. Corp. of
Am., 397 F. Supp. 63, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The alleged duress must be proven to
have been the result of defendant's conduct and not of the plaintiff's own necessi-
ties."); Ruggiero, 977 F.2d at 314 ("Moreover, the mere fact that one is in a difficult
bargaining position due to desperate financial circumstances does not support a de-
fense of economic duress."); Sheehan, 812 F2d at 469 ("While we recognize the
court's role in protecting persons from economic exploitation, we also note the impor-
tance of the notion of freedom of contract .... "); Texas Commerce Bank, NA., 789 F.
Supp. at 853-54 ("When circumstances present a person with a series of alternatives,
all of which are bad, the choice of the least bad is not duress."); Cochran, 758 F. Supp.
at 1556-57 ("To maintain a claim of economic duress or coercion ... serious financial
harm must be threatened, and the person allegedly applying the coercion must act
unlawfully.").
104. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 84, at 337 ("[T]he general rule is that any
wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.").
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Unquestionably, the government assumes a stronger bargaining po-
sition in negotiations with a public housing tenant. In any bargaining
relationship, however, there may be some element of duress.1  The
presence of limited choices and unequal bargaining power, by them-
selves, however, do not constitute duress. If public housing tenants
were able to void agreements because of limited choices and unequal
bargaining power, then any lease signed by them would be unenforce-
able. This result supports the proposition that a person can avoid con-
tractual obligations simply because of his or her impoverished
circumstances. This is inconsistent, however, with accepted principles
of contract law.106
2. Unconscionability
Critics also argue that leases containing consent clauses are uncon-
scionable. A contract is unconscionable if its terms are so one-sided
as to oppress or unfairly surprise a contracting party.10 7 Courts often
use the doctrine to deny enforcement of agreements whose procedural
defects do not rise to the level of actionable duress.'0 8 The unconscio-
nability doctrine has become a standard part of contract law and is
incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code' 0 9 and the Restate-
ment of Contracts." 0 The official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302 states,
"The basic test is whether.., the clauses involved are so one-sided as
to be unconscionable .... "I"
Generally, courts have defined unconscionability as either "proce-
dural" or "substantive.""' Procedural unconscionability refers to a
defect in the bargaining process"13 and usually involves a practice that
reduces an individual's ability to make a rational choice," 4 e.g., "Just
105. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum. L.
Rev. 603, 603-04 (1943).
106. See Scott & Leslie, supra note 99, at 433.
107. Black's Law Dictionary 1524 (6th ed. 1990).
108. See Scott & Leslie, supra note 99, at 499.
109. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). In its entirety, the section reads:(1) If a court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
110. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) [hereinafter Restatement].
The language of the Restatement is similar to the language of U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
111. U.C.C. § 2-302 cnt. 1 (1987).
112. Arthur Leff first made the distinction between procedural and substantive un-
conscionability. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's





sign here; don't worry about the small print on the back.""' 5 Substan-
tive unconscionability refers to the terms of the agreement itself and
often concerns an unreasonable price or contract term," 6 e.g., "I have
the right to cut off one of your child's fingers for each day you are in
default."'1 17 The Restatement indicates that a contract can be uncon-
scionable even if neither element is present." 8
Critics charge that the use of form leases by public housing authori-
ties is procedurally unconscionable. Because form leases are stan-
dardized documents consisting of pre-drafted terms, they offer tenants
little or no opportunity for negotiation." 9 Thus, an inherent danger of
standardized contracts is that they may be used by an enterprise hav-
ing such disproportionately strong economic power that it may simply
dictate, rather than propose, the terms of the contract.1 20
These types of documents are often called adhesion contracts be-
cause the only alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection
of the terms. 2' Public housing leases with consent clauses may be
considered adhesion contracts because public housing tenants have no
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement.
Notwithstanding the potential difficulties with form leases, they
provide a benefit to both public housing authorities and tenants. They
allow the landlord to avoid the costs of negotiating and drafting a sep-
arate lease with each tenant,"2 which reduces administrative costs
that would normally be passed on in the form of higher rent. In addi-
tion, a judicial interpretation of one standard lease serves as an inter-
pretation of similar leases.123 This allows for a better calculation of
risks by the parties as well as uniformity in court decisions."z These
advantages have led to the widespread use of standardized contracts
in many routine business transactions."2 As a result, courts are in-
creasingly willing to enforce such contracts. 26
115. James . White & Robert S. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code 151 (2d ed. 1980).
116. Scott & Leslie, supra note 99, at 56.
117. White & Summers, supra note 115, at 151.
118. Restatement, supra note 110, § 208 cmt. c ("[I]t is possible for a contract to be
oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the bargaining pro-
cess and no single term which is in itself unconscionable.").
119. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 64, at 439-40; see 1 E. Allan Farnsworth,
Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.26, at 478-80 (1990).
120. Farnsworth, supra note 119, § 4.26, at 480.
121. Id
122. Id at 478-79.
123. Id at 479.
124. Id
125. Examples include automobile purchase orders, credit card agreements, insur-
ance policies, and most residential leases. Id.
126. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding
an adhesion contract absent strong evidence of fraud or duress); Bauer v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1992) ("[P]rinted form
contracts offered on a take it or leave it basis, alone, do not render the agreement an
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There are cases, however, where standardized leases have been de-
clared to be unconscionable, typically involving obscure clauses that
shift responsibility away from the drafter. For example, in Weaver v.
American Oil Co.," 7 the court held that a clause in a standardized
lease, which shifted substantial pecuniary responsibility to the non-
drafter, was unconscionable because "the clause was in fine print and
contained no title heading."'12 8 Similarly, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors,129 the court struck a disclaimer clause from a standardized
sales contract because the clause was in small print on the reverse side
of the contract.' 30
To avoid unconscionable contract claims, public housing authorities
utilizing consent clauses should emphasize the presence of such
clauses to tenants before they sign leases. If there is little doubt that
tenants are aware of such clauses, courts will feel less compelled to
strike the consent clauses from leases.
It is also important to note that under both the Restatement and the
U.C.C., unequal bargaining power alone, often associated with the use
of standardized forms, will not render an agreement unconscionable.
Comment d of Section 208 of the Restatement states, "A bargain is
not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in
bargaining position.'1 31 Similarly, the U.C.C. states, "The principle
[of unconscionability] is one of prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power."' 32 Therefore, tenants cannot claim that
the agreement is procedurally unconscionable merely because they
are weaker financially.
Even without duress or procedural unconscionability in the bargain-
ing process, a contract can still be unconscionable if the substance of
the contract, or any clause therein, is shockingly unfair. Most cases
involving substantive unconscionability involve an excessive monetary
price or an unfair modification of a parties' remedies. 33 Neither cir-
cumstance is implicated by the consent clause. In addition, the fact
that consent clauses involve surrender of a constitutional right is not a
shocking circumstance. The Supreme Court has affirmed the view
that a person can surrender constitutional rights by contract.134
adhesion contract."); Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
("[T]he mere fact that the clause is contained in a form agreement [does not] support
a finding of unconscionability.").
127. 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
128. Id. at 147.
129. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
130. Id at 94-95.
131. Restatement, supra note 110, § 208 cmt. d.
132. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
133. White & Summers, supra note 115, at 155.
134. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding the use of a
forum selection clause printed on the back of a cruise ticket); see also Snepp v. United
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Individuals may voluntarily contract away Fourth Amendment
rights. The public housing lease containing a consent clause consti-
tutes a voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment because there
is no duress in the bargaining process. In addition, the acceptance of
form leases as a useful bargaining tool, along with an emphasis on the
presence of the consent clause, indicates that the lease is not uncon-
scionable. Accordingly, public housing leases containing consent
clauses fall under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE UNCONSTrTUTIONAL CONDrIONs DOCTRINE
While public housing leases containing consent clauses fit under the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, opponents of the
clauses will argue that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions bars
their use. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions posits that the
government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the benefi-
ciary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
otherwise withhold the benefit altogether. 35 As applied to consent
clauses in public housing leases, the unconstitutional conditions argu-
ment is that the government may not condition the receipt of govern-
ment-run housing on the surrender of Fourth Amendment rights, even
if it could withhold all federal housing assistance.
Although many benefits provided by the government have condi-
tions attached, not all raise unconstitutional conditions problems. Un-
constitutional conditions problems arise when the government
provides a benefit that it is not compelled to provide, and offers that
benefit on the condition that the recipient perform or forego an activ-
ity that is constitutionally protected. 36 Unconstitutional conditions
problems do not arise when the government is obligated to provide a
benefit, because in that instance, the government may not attach con-
ditions to that benefit. 13  Because the Supreme Court has not recog-
nized a constitutional right to housing,' the use of consent clauses
merits scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The doctrine first developed during the Lochner era 39 to protect
common-law rights in property and contract in response to the rise of
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (surrendering First Amendment rights); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (surrendering Fourth Amendment rights).
135. Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1415.
136. Id at 1421-22.
137. Id at 1423.
138. An effort to establish a fundamental interest in housing failed in Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In sustaining a forcible eviction procedure after nonpay-
ment of rent, the Court stated, "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill." Id. at 74.
139. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as forbidding legisla-
tion that unduly restricted "freedom of contract" between private parties. See Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down on due process grounds a New
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a regulatory state. 4 ' In the earliest cases,14 1 the Supreme Court held
that while states could exclude a foreign corporation from local busi-
ness or prohibit private carriers from using public highways, they
could not condition such privileges on surrender of constitutional
rights.'42 The doctrine fell into disuse as the New Deal emerged and
the Court abandoned the Lochner application of economic substan-
tive due process.'43 It reemerged under the Warren Court's applica-
tion of substantive due process to protect individual rights to free
speech, religion, association, and privacy. 4 The Court has applied
the doctrine to hold that the government may not condition public
unemployment benefits on acceptance of work on one's religious holi-
day, 145 tax exemptions or government jobs on political views,'46 or
subsidies for public broadcasting on abstinence from editorializing.' 47
The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the doctrine to all
cases in which a person is asked to give up a constitutional right to
receive a benefit.' 48 For example, while the Court has held that denial
of unemployment compensation to Saturday sabbatarians unconstitu-
York law that limited bakers' work days to eight hours). For a detailed discussion of
the origin and development of the Lochner Era, see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional
Law 444-53 (12th ed. 1991).
140. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 294 (1993).
141. Language concerning unconstitutional conditions appears as far back as 1876.
See, e.g., Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissent-
ing) ("Though a State may have the power.., of prohibiting all foreign corporations
from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitu-
tional conditions upon their doing so.").
142. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (striking
down a requirement that companies wishing to use public highways first had to apply
for a permit); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (barring states from
conditioning corporate privileges on surrender of access to federal courts); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) (striking down a requirement that compa-
nies wishing to use public highways first had to apply for a permit).
143. The decline of Lochnerism began with the decision in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), when the Court determined that a state was free "to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose." Id. at 537. It was not
until 1937, however, that the Court explicitly overruled Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923), one of the major Lochner era precedents. West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins and upholding a state minimum
wage law for women). See also Gunther, supra note 139, at 455-57 (discussing the
decline of Lochnerism and the impact of Nebbia and West Coast Hotel).
144. See Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1416 ("Untouched by the falling rubble as the
New Deal leveled and rebuilt the substantive priorities of constitutional liberty, the
doctrine... reemerged under the Warren Court. .. ").
145. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
146. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
147. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
148. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward A Positive Theory of Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1187 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Un-
constitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
10-11 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1416-17.
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tionally infringes upon freedom of religion,14 9 it also has held that re-
fusal to grant food stamps to striking workers does not infringe upon
freedom of speech or of association.' 50 And while the Court has held
that exempting magazines from state taxation based on subject matter
unconstitutionally infringes upon speech, 5 ' it also has held that
choosing to subsidize only medical expenses related to childbirth and
not to abortion does not infringe upon fundamental reproductive
rights.'52 The Court's inconsistency has led to a vigorous debate about
the proper application of the doctrine.' 3
This part will present three primary views of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine-Holmesianism,'5 Defense of the Doctrine, and
Abandonment-and conclude that the approach under the abandon-
ment view is the appropriate analysis of unconstitutional conditions
claims.
A. Holmesianism
The Holmesian view rejects the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions and argues that the government's greater power to create a pro-
gram includes the lesser power to impose conditions on the benefits of
the program. This view was held by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
whose most famous statement of his position can be found in McAu-
liffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.'55 There, Justice Holmes, responding
to a police officer's claim that he was unfairly discharged for his polit-
ical views, stated that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
... The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him.' 56 Under this greater-power-includes-
the-lesser-power approach, courts should almost never invalidate con-
ditions attached to government benefits.
Today, Chief Justice William Rehnquist is the most prominent advo-
cate of the Holmesian approach. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill,5 7 the Cleveland Board of Education dismissed two em-
149. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
150. Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
151. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
152. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
153. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968); Baker, supra note 148; Epstein, supra
note 148; Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,
Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 Stan. L- Rev. 553 (1992); Sullivan,
supra note 69; Sunstein, supra note 140.
154. See Sunstein, supra note 140, at 294.
155. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
156. k at 517-18.
157. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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ployees. 158 The former employees challenged the propriety of admin-
istrative procedures on due process grounds, claiming that the Ohio
statutes did not afford them an opportunity to respond to charges
prior to their removal."5 9 The Court held that the statutes provided
sufficient due process, but because the employees claimed that they
had no chance to respond to the charges leveled against them, the
lower court had erred in dismissing their complaint. 60 Justice Rehn-
quist, in dissent, noted that the subjective and unpredictable interpre-
tation of the Due Process Clause in these types of cases would result
in a different decision in every case.' 6 ' To avoid the varying interpre-
tations, Justice Rehnquist, echoing Justice Holmes' statements almost
one hundred years earlier, argued that the court should "hold that one
who avails himself of government entitlements accepts the grants of
tenure along with its inherent limitations."' 62 Similarly, in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 63 Justice Rehnquist utilized
the greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power approach in upholding a
ban on casino advertising aimed at Puerto Rican residents." n Rehn-
quist rejected an argument that the ban violated the First Amend-
ment: "In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
casino gambling."' 65
Clearly, the result under this view is dramatic-the government al-
ways wins. t66 When citizens participate in a program to which they
have no constitutional right, the Constitution places no constraints on
the type and number of conditions the government imposes. The dan-
ger is that the size of the modem regulatory state transforms this
greater-includes-the-lesser argument into a blank check for the gov-
ernment. 167 For this reason, despite its presence in recent opinions,
the Holmesian approach has been widely criticized.' 68
B. Defense of the Doctrine
The second view seeks to preserve Lochner-like substantive due
process rights in the face of threats posed by a modem regulatory gov-
emment. Thus, this view supports the unconstitutional conditions
158. Id. at 535-37.
159. Id at 536-37.
160. Id. at 547-48.
161. Id. at 563 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
164. Id. at 348.
165. Id at 345-46.
166. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 295.
167. Van Alstyne, supra note 153, at 1461-62.
168. See Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1417-18; Sunstein, supra note 140, at 296; see
also Stuntz, supra note 153, at 566-67 nn. 50-52 (describing commentators' criticisms
of the Holmesian view).
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doctrine. One modem advocate of this view is Professor Richard Ep-
stein.169 Professor Epstein, fiercely protective of an individual's right
to be free of interference by others in all economic and social deci-
sions,170 posits that a "presumption of distrust should attach to all gov-
ernment action."' 171 Epstein construes the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as a valid mechanism to "take back" some of the power that
the Supreme Court has conferred upon government officials."7 As a
result of this expansive regulatory authority, the government has be-
come a monopolist in the areas of social and economic legislation. 73
Accordingly, the government "should be limited both in the conces-
sions that it may exact from private [parties] and in the conditions it
may impose on them."'74 On this point, Epstein defends the doctrine,
but only as a second-best alternative to what would be a constitutional
ideal-the outright prohibition of all government spending and taxing
programs.175
Professor Kathleen Sullivan is another modern advocate of the doc-
trine, 176 although she rejects Epstein's approach because she believes
that it does not go far enough to protect individuals' rights.'" Instead,
Professor Sullivan calls for a "vigorous defense" of the doctrine, 178
claiming that it needs to be applied more often. 79 She would subject
to strict review80 "any government benefit condition whose primary
purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exer-
cise of a preferred constitutional liberty."'' Unlike Epstein, however,
169. See Epstein, supra note 148.
170. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L Rev. 431,
501 (1993).
171. Epstein, supra note 148, at 104.
172. Epstein contends that the doctrine would be unnecessary if the Court had re-
stricted the scope of the government power in the first place. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 22.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 28; see also Sunstein, supra note 140, at 297 (describing Epstein's view
that the doctrine operates as a second-best substitute for the outright prohibition of
spending and taxing programs); Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1418 (same).
176. Sullivan, supra note 69.
177. Id. at 1418.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Because most legislation involving fundamental rights imposes burdens on one
classification of persons, most fundamental rights cases are examined under the stan-
dards used in equal protection cases. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitu-
tional Law 580 (4th ed. 1991). There are three standards of review utilized in equal
protection cases: strict scrutiny, rational relationship, and intermediate scrutiny. Id. at
574-76. Under the strict scrutiny standard, the Court will only allow the legislation if
the government shows a "compelling" interest in passing the legislation. Id. at 575.
The intermediate scrutiny standard imposes a lighter burden on the government; it
must show that the legislation has a substantial relationship to an important govern-
ment interest. Id. at 576. Finally, under the rational relationship standard, which im-
poses almost no burden on the government, the legislation simply must have a
rational relationship to any legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 580.
181. Sullivan, supra note 69, at 1499-1500.
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Professor Sullivan recognizes that some governmental burdens may
survive strict scrutiny and thus concludes that there may be instances
when the government can constitutionally burden a preferred
liberty.'82
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is based on Loch-
ner-like principles "that have been roundly repudiated in the twenti-
eth century,'8 3 the doctrine is ill-suited to the modern regulatory
state. The ever expanding view of the commerce clause and govern-
ment spending power results in modern legislation that generally in-
volves some type of government oversight or regulation.1s4
Advocates of the doctrine would characterize almost every govern-
ment spending decision as suspect and render many of them unconsti-
tutional. For this reason, this use of the doctrine would be
inappropriate in today's heavily regulated society.
C. Abandonment
The final view, articulated by Cass Sunstein, rejects the doctrine and
urges its abandonment.8 5 This approach is similar to the Holmesian
view to the extent that it regards the doctrine as a creation of Loch-
ner-era principles that are no longer useful under the modern system
of government. This position recognizes that the principles underlying
the doctrine are useful in alerting courts that a government spending
decision may infringe on a constitutionally protected right, but argues
that a formalist doctrine is not necessary to perform this function.18 6
Rather than defining all government conditions as unconstitutional,
this approach inquires into the nature of the interest affected by the
government and the reasons offered by the government for its intru-
sion: Does the government have a legitimate justification for intrud-
ing upon a constitutionally protected interest?8 7
To determine whether an unconstitutional condition exists under
this approach, the most important factor is the constitutional provi-
sion at issue.s Because each constitutional provision carries with it
distinct rights and countervailing justifications, every case will yield a
different result. The doctrine is flawed because it results in a blanket
application to all conditional benefits, and it does not account for the
individual constitutional provision and its corresponding rights and
limitations. The cases reviewed below demonstrate the Supreme
Court's ability to weigh the constitutional intrusion against the gov-
182. Id at 1503. For example, Sullivan agrees with the outcome in Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), because there was compelling justification for pressuring
Snepp's rights. Id.
183. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 298.
184. See id. at 297-98.
185. Idt at 291-318.
186. Id at 305.
187. Id at 292.
188. Id at 306.
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ernment's justifications for such intrusion without formally invoking
the doctrine.
In Snepp v. United States,189 the Supreme Court upheld the condi-
tion and refused to apply the doctrine. The Court permitted the use
of a secrecy agreement between the government and an employee of
the CIA even though the agreement unquestionably burdened the
employee's First Amendment rights. 19° The employee's rights argua-
bly were infringed upon because the agreement required any publica-
tion to be reviewed by the agency prior to distribution.1 91 The Court
reasoned, however, that an agent's publication of unreviewed material
relating to CIA activities could be detrimental to national security. 92
Even though the government intruded upon a constitutional right, it
had compelling justifications for such intrusion-protecting national
security.
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,193 the
Court struck down the condition, also without applying the doctrine.
Here, a woman was fired from her job because she refused, for reli-
gious reasons, to work on the Sabbath.' 91 The Florida Bureau of Un-
employment Compensation denied her benefits on the ground that
Hobbie's refusal to work constituted misconduct.195 The Bureau's de-
cision intruded upon Hobbie's First Amendment right of freedom of
religion because it forced her to choose between following her religion
or surrendering benefits. 96 After the Bureau conceded that there was
no compelling interest that justified the refusal of benefits, t97 the
Court reversed the lower court's decision to withhold benefits.1 98
Although the facts of Snepp and Hobbie differ, they both involve a
similar problem-surrendering a constitutional right as a prerequisite
to obtaining a governmental benefit. Despite the implications of un-
constitutional conditions problems in each case, the Court did not util-
ize the doctrine. Instead, the Court merely examined the justification
offered for the constitutional intrusion. In Snepp, the Court found
189. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
190. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
191. Snepp argued that the agreement was unenforceable because it was a prior
restraint on speech. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. Although there is a strong presump-
tion against prior restraints, see e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."), one court has upheld a prior
restraint on speech when national security is involved. See United States v. Progres-
sive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (preventing a magazine from publishing
an article containing technical information about the hydrogen bomb).
192. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511-12.
193. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
194. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138.
195. Id. at 138-39.
196. Id. at 140 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
197. Id at 141.
198. Id at 146.
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compelling justification for the intrusion, while in Hobbie it did not.
Unlike Sullivan, who suggests strict scrutiny as a standard of review,199
Sunstein's approach requires only a "legitimate justification" for in-
trusion upon a constitutional right.200 Thus, the inquiry, as applied to
consent clauses, is whether the government has a legitimate justifica-
tion for using consent clauses to facilitate housing sweeps, a matter
discussed in part III.
D. The Future of the Doctrine
In addition to Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,20 1
discussed above,2 1 two recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that
use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will likely be aban-
doned in the future. In Lyng v. International Union, UAW" °3 and Rust
v. Sullivan,2 °4 the Court refused to apply the doctrine and upheld the
challenged statutory provisions. °5
Lyng involved a challenge to a 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp
Act, which provided that food stamps would not be distributed to
otherwise eligible workers who are on strike.2° The union claimed
that the amendment provision forced workers to sacrifice their First
Amendment right of association to obtain food stamps.2 °7 The Court
was faced with a classic unconstitutional conditions problem:
Although Congress need not have provided food stamps at all, once it
did, it could not discriminate between striking and non-striking work-
ers. The Court refused to apply the doctrine and deferred to Congress
to shape the eligibility requirements under the Food Stamp Pro-
gram.208 In so holding, the Court decided that the government's
greater power to create the Food Stamp Program also included the
lesser power to exclude striking workers from receiving such benefits.
Rust v. Sullivan209 also rejects the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions. Rust extends previous cases where the Court held that the
government need not provide assistance to women who choose to
have an abortion.210 Rust involved Title X of the Public Health Ser-
vice Act, which provides federal funding for family-planning serv-
ices.21' The Act specifically provides that "[n]one of the funds
199. See supra note 180.
200. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 306.
201. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
203. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
204. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
205. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 363-64; Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
206. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 362-63.
207. Id at 363-64.
208. Id. at 372-73.
209. Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
210. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
211. Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
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appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning. 212
The regulations promulgated under the Act prohibited any counsel-
ling concerning abortion or referrals of a pregnant woman to an abor-
tion provider.213 Several doctors and patients challenged the
regulations, claiming that the regulations forced doctors to relinquish
their constitutional right to freedom of speech-specifically the right
to engage in abortion advocacy and counselling-to receive govern-
ment benefits 14 The petitioners also claimed that the regulations vi-
olated a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to
terminate her pregnancy.2 Once again, the Court employed a
greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power argument and refused to find
the regulations unconstitutional. 216
The decisions in Lyng, Rust, and Posadas indicate that in the future,
the Court may be hostile to unconstitutional conditions arguments.217
It is arguable that this hostility may result in the further revival of the
greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power argument.21  In light of
these decisions and the questionable future of the doctrine, Sunstein's
argument that the doctrine is an anachronism is persuasive. Thus,
rather than applying the doctrine to analyze unconstitutional condi-
tions problems, it is preferable to balance the nature of the interest
affected by the government and the reasons offered by the govern-
ment for its intrusion.219
III. APPLICATION OF THE SUNSTEIN APPROACH TO PUBLIC
HOUSING CONSENT CLAUSES
This part applies Sunstein's approach to the issue of consent clauses
in public housing leases. Under Sunstein's approach, there is a two-
pronged analysis. First, the court must inquire into the constitutional
provision at issue and the interest it protects. Second, provided that
there is an intrusion upon such interest, the court must examine the
reasons offered by the government for such intrusion. Critics may
212. Id at 178 (citation omitted).
213. Id at 179.
214. Id at 196.
215. Id at 201.
216. Id. at 190-203.
217. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-8, at 681 n.29 (2d
ed. 1988) ("A few recent Supreme Court decisions have cast doubt on the continued
validity of the doctrine.").
218. Id.; Stuntz, supra note 153, at 567 n.51.
219. When fundamental rights are implicated, legislative action is subject to "strict
scrutiny," which can only be overcome by compelling justifications. See supra note
180. But cf FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,407 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, CJ. and White, I., dissenting) (supporting proposition that constitu-
tional rights are sufficiently protected any time a "rational relationship" exists be-




contend that the use of consent clauses represents an intrusion upon
tenants' Fourth Amendment rights. An analysis of the interests pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, weighed against the justifications
for intrusion, however, show that the use of consent clauses is consti-
tutionally permissible.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.24u
The Amendment was a direct response to the abuses suffered by the
colonists at the hands of ruling British officers.22' In an effort to pre-
vent the American colonies from trading with non-English industry,
the British government enacted various trade restrictions.2 2 The
most vile restrictions were called writs of assistance .2 3 These general
warrants, issued without probable cause, particularity, or prior judicial
approval, empowered officials to invade citizens' homes at will and
ransack the premises to search for evidence of crimes-particularly
evidence of illegally imported goods.' 4 The abuse in the writs lay not
only in the generality of their scope and virtually unlimited power to
search anyone at anytime, but that there was no return requirement
after search and seizure.' In addition, once issued, writs survived six
months past the death of the issuing sovereign.226 It was this history
of wholesale and indiscriminate searches for evidence of criminal ac-
tivity that led the Framers to create the Fourth Amendment.2 7
The Fourth Amendment serves as a constitutional protection
against the "long reach of government" 8 and embodies a deeply-
held belief that "to value the privacy of home and person... is... to
value human dignity.212 9 The protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment are inherent in the requirements that consent be volun-
220. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
221. Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 20 (1966).
222. Itt at 30; HaHl, supra note 15, § 1:3, at 6.
223. Landynsld, supra note 221, at 30-31.
224. Hal, supra note 15, § 1:3, at 6; Landynski, supra note 221, at 31.
225. Hal, supra note 15, § 1:3, at 6.
226. Id
227. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that indis-
criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants'
were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.").




tary and the resulting search reasonable.3 This Note argues that
consent obtained by a consent clause is voluntary. The reasonable-
ness of a search, however, cannot be determined until the search is
conducted.3 Provided that both elements are present, the govern-
ment has not intruded upon any fundamental interests.
B. Justifying the Use of Housing Sweeps
Assuming arguendo that consent clauses represent an intrusion
upon public housing tenants' Fourth Amendment rights, the severity
of conditions that exist in public housing projects provide compelling
justification to allow sweeps based on consent clauses. The following
discussion explores some of the government's reasons to use consent
clauses as a means to restore order to large urban public housing
projects.
1. Protect Health, Safety, and Welfare of Residents -2
The government of the United States was created to "establish Jus-
tice, insure domestic Tranquility... [and] promote the general Wel-
fare" 3 of its citizens. In addition, under the Housing Act of 1949,
the government established the national housing policy of "a decent
home and a suitable living environment for every American fam-
ily."'  As indicated by tenants' horror stories, myriad legislation, and
available statistics, the government has failed miserably in attempting
to achieve these goals in public housing.
When the drug problem exploded in the United States during the
1980s and severely afflicted public housing developments, the govern-
ment responded to this crisis. Congress passed the Public Housing
Drug Elimination Act23 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988.36 In this legislation, Congress recognized that "the Federal
Government has a duty to provide public and other federally assisted
low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal
drugs." 23 7 Public housing sweeps, similar to those conducted in Chi-
230. All searches conducted under the Fourth Amendment carry with them a re-
quirement of reasonableness. Hall, supra note 15, § 1:19, at 27-29; see Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
231. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) ("The reasonableness of an
official invasion of the citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that invasion occurred.").
232. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)
("We have no difficulty in concluding that the [legislature's] interest in the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest.").
233. U.S. Const. pmbl.
234. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949).
235. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat. 4301, 4301-03 (1988) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11925 (Supp. V 1993)).
236. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1509 (1988)).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 11901(1) (Supp. V 1993).
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cago, are an attempt to achieve goals espoused as far back as the
Framers and as recently as President Clinton's promise to provide safe
housing for public housing tenants.
2. Maintain Safe and Sanitary Conditions Inside Housing Units
Public housing developments are not only plagued by crime, but
also a deterioration of physical conditions within the units.238 When
public housing officials inspect units during sweeps, they examine all
structural elements to ensure that the public housing authority is com-
plying with HUD regulations and to identify and address all mainte-
nance problems in the unit.239 The public housing authorities have a
strong incentive to ensure that the physical condition of the units is
properly maintained because physical deterioration diminishes resi-
dents' quality of life. In addition, those units that are in the worst
shape are often abandoned.240 These vacant units are frequently used
for illegal activity, and the presence of non-residents reduces safety in
the community.241
3. Ensure Proper Residency
Another goal of the sweeps is to ensure that only authorized resi-
dents are living in the units. Trespassers and unauthorized residents
are often responsible for crime committed in public housing. Again,
any effort to reduce the number of non-residents will increase safety
in the community. In addition, with periodic sweeps, public housing
authorities can ensure that they are receiving the correct rent. Be-
cause rents are based on tenants' income, some tenants may not re-
port additional family members whose income would increase the
amount of rent paid. Collecting the proper rent is important because
rental revenues are used for other programs aimed at enhancing com-
munity life.
4. Maintaining a Sense of Community
Sweeps alone cannot solve the problems that exist in public hous-
ing. Only the residents can cure the ills by forming a community and
creating a livable environment. Unfortunately, many residents are
afraid to leave their apartments, thereby frustrating even the boldest
attempts at community empowerment. Any efforts to improve public
housing are likely to fail unless crime is tackled first. The sweeps indi-
cate to residents that the public housing authority is willing to take the
first step in creating a community. Only through a reduction in crime
will other social problems of public housing be remedied. Sweeps are
238. The Final Report, supra note 6, at 78-80.
239. See supra note 10.




an important tool to control crime and return a sense of community to
ravaged public housing projects.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that the government may require public housing
tenants to consent to searches as a condition of receiving such hous-
ing. Such consent may be obtained through the insertion of a consent
clause into public housing leases. The use of such clauses survives
constitutional scrutiny and fulfills the requirements of an enforceable
bargain.
Although the Fourth Amendment is one of the most important
rights that individuals possess, nothing bars these same individuals
from surrendering its protection. The only requirement is that such
abdication is voluntary. The signing of a public housing lease with a
consent clause meets the voluntariness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment because the agreement is not the product of duress. In
addition, the compelling justifications for allowing the sweeps out-
weigh the benefits of Fourth Amendment protection.
Consent clauses are important because they facilitate the use of
housing sweeps. Housing sweeps are a drastic response to a crime
problem that is, at times, out of control. Admittedly, the problems
within the nation's public housing developments are beyond anything
that sweeps, alone, can cure. Conceding that sweeps are only a partial
solution, however, does not render the argument for their use invalid.
It is a recognition that only the members of a community, working in
unison, will cure the social ills that exist in public housing. But when
the residents are too fearful to come out of their apartments to be-
come a community, community empowerment is impossible, and the
problems will continue to exist. The sweeps are an effective way to
prove to the residents of public housing that the government is mak-
ing an effort to develop such a community, so that the goal of a decent
home and suitable living environment for every American family will
be fulfilled.
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